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What’s wrong with essentialism?  
 
Anne Phillips 
 
This paper identifies and discusses four distinct meanings of essentialism. The first is the 
attribution of certain characteristics to everyone subsumed within a particular category: 
the ‘(all) women are caring and empathetic’, ‘(all) Africans have rhythm’, ’(all) Asians 
are community oriented’ syndrome. The second is the attribution of those characteristics 
to the category, in ways that naturalise or reify what may be socially created or 
constructed. The third is the invocation of a collectivity as either the subject or object of 
political action (‘the working class’, ‘women’, ‘Third World women’), in a move that 
seems to presume a homogenised and unified group. The fourth is the policing of this 
collective category, the treatment of its supposedly shared characteristics as the defining 
ones that cannot be questioned or modified without undermining an individual’s claim to 
belong to that group. Focusing on these four variants enables us to see that the issue is 
sometimes one of degree rather than a categorical embargo.  
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Work on feminism and multiculturalism increasingly summons up for criticism the 
spectre of cultural essentialism. This runs as a thread through the essays in a recent 
collection on Sexual Justice/ Cultural Justice (Arneil et al, 2006). It figures in a ‘mapping 
of the terrain’ as the object of an entire school of post-colonial feminism (Shachar, 2007). 
And though I do not much use (or like) the term, I have been willing enough to hear my 
own work on Multiculturalism  without Culture described as a critique of cultural 
essentialism. As its deployment in such works confirms, essentialism is thought to be a 
bad thing. We do not, on the whole, say, ‘that position is essentialist and that’s why I like 
it’; or, ‘I have some sympathy with your argument, but find it insufficiently essentialist’. 
As Ian Hacking (1999:17) puts it, ‘most people who use (essentialism) use it as a slur 
word, intending to put down the opposition’.  
Yet it is also commonly argued that we cannot avoid at least some kind of 
essentialism: that it is a politically necessary shorthand; or even, in some arguments, a 
psychologically inevitable feature of the way human beings think. Diana Fuss (1989) has 
argued that the essentialism/ constructionism binary blocks innovative thinking, 
providing people with too easy a basis for unreflective dismissal. Gayatri Spivak (1988) 
famously wrote of a strategic essentialism that could invoke a collective category – like 
the subaltern or women – while simultaneously criticising the category as theoretically 
unviable. Though she subsequently distanced herself from what she saw as misuses of the 
notion of strategic essentialism, the idea that we may have to ‘take the risk of essence’ in 
order to have any political purchase remains an important theme in feminist theory and 
politics.  
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From a different direction, it is sometimes said that while essentialist constructs 
are, in a sense, category mistakes – drawing the boundaries between peoples or things in 
the wrong place - there is not much point rubbishing them as analytically wrong, because 
once in existence, they become part of our social reality. Anthropologist Gerd Baumann 
simultaneously criticises and accommodates an ‘ethnic reductionism’ that divided the 
population he was studying in Southall, London, into five religio-ethnic groups: Sikhs, 
Hindus, Muslims, African Caribbeans, and whites. The categorisation was, he argues, 
seriously misleading, privileging one kind of group identity over others that were more 
important, and obscuring the dynamic ways in which group boundaries are drawn and 
redrawn. For many of his older interviewees, it was a particular region of the Indian sub-
continent (the Punjab, Gujarat, Bengal), or particular island of the Caribbean, that 
provided the key terms of self and other identification; for some of the younger ones, a 
new ‘Asian’ identity was being forged that cut across distinctions between Hindu, 
Muslim and Sikh.  The static five-way categorisation - widely employed by local 
politicians and policy makers, but also by the communities it was describing - reduced or 
denied this complexity. It mis-represented culture as ‘an imprisoning cocoon or a 
determining force’ (Baumann, 1996:1), encouraged potentially racist stereotypes, and 
significantly underplayed the multiple and imaginative ways in which people negotiate 
their cultural identities. For all his criticism, however, Baumann does not consider it 
appropriate simply to dismiss ‘folk reifications’ as falsely essentialised constructs. Once 
they have entered into people’s self-definitions, they assume a life of their own.i 
Some psychologists, meanwhile, have suggested that essentialist thinking might 
just be part of the human condition, meaning that part of the way human beings process 
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complex information is to seek out a deeper property – what we might then term an 
essence –linking the things that look alike. If we conceptualise racist thinking, for 
example, as the presumption that visible differences of skin colour or physiognomy 
indicate something significant about other characteristics like intelligence or 
temperament, then maybe part of what sustains racist thinking is an innate tendency 
within the way we process information. Drawing on studies of pre-school children in 
Europe and the US, Lawrence Hirschfeld (1996) notes that children as young as four 
understand racial types in terms of an underlying essence, attributing differences in skin 
colour to something heritable and fixed at birth, while seeing differences in body shape or 
occupation as more susceptible to change.ii Though stressing that the use of race markers 
as a basis for dividing people up into different kinds may be specific to particular epochs 
and societies, he suggests that the tendency to create ‘human kinds’, and attribute to at 
least some of these a ‘nonobvious commonality that all members of the kind share’ 
(p196) (an essence, in other words) is built into our conceptual system. He is not saying it 
is impossible to eradicate notions of race from our mental repertoires, but he makes the 
plausible point that telling children race is unimportant (as in the advice that ‘we are all 
the same inside’) will not be the most effective strategy if it fails to accord with a deeply 
rooted tendency to think in terms of essentially differentiated groups. The particular 
features we employ to identify groups will be shaped by history; but the process of 
identifying a group by some presumed essence may not be so.  
Even setting aside the still contested terrain of conceptual systems, it is clear that 
theoretical analysis depends on at least some process of abstraction. This typically 
involves separating out something deemed core from other things deemed peripheral, so 
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appears almost by definition to involve claims about accident and essence. Sociologists 
from the days of Max Weber have been encouraged to hone their analytical tools through 
the construction of ideal types. Analytic philosophers characteristically develop their 
arguments by stripping away misleading ‘contingencies’ in order to identify essential 
points. If we take essentialism to mean the process of differentiating something deemed 
essential from other things regarded as contingent, this can appear as a relatively 
uncontroversial description of the very process of thought. 
Like most of those who have used the term, I continue to think essentialism a bad 
thing - but what exactly is wrong with it? Is it a matter of degree, a question of context, or 
something that must be avoided at all costs? Part of my previous reluctance to employ the 
term is that it covers a multitude of possible sins, and in what follows, I identify and 
discuss four distinct meanings. The first is the attribution of certain characteristics to 
everyone subsumed within a particular category: the ‘(all) women are caring and 
empathetic’, ‘(all) Africans have rhythm’, ’(all) Asians are community oriented’ 
syndrome. The second is the attribution of those characteristics to the category, in ways 
that naturalise or reify what may be socially created or constructed. The third is the 
invocation of a collectivity as either the subject or object of political action (‘the working 
class’, ‘women’, ‘Third World women’), in a move that seems to presume a homogenised 
and unified group. The fourth is the policing of this collective category, the treatment of 
its supposedly shared characteristics as the defining ones that cannot be questioned or 
modified without undermining an individual’s claim to belong to that group.  
The four are clearly not identical, so one might be engaged in essentialised 
thinking on one score while managing to avoid it on others. Indeed, one of the ironies of 
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essentialism is that social critics challenging the structures of thought that sustain racism 
and sexism commonly attack the first two, but are often criticised in their turn for falling 
into the third or fourth. It is, in fact, in our political engagements that we are most likely 
to fall foul of one or other version of essentialism. By the beginning of the twenty-first 
century, it is hard to find reputable scholars who can be plausibly castigated for their 
deployment of essentialised categories: we have most of us been sufficiently sensitised to 
the dangers to avoid such talk. In our political activities, by contrast, or in policy advice 
that divides populations into distinct religio-ethnic communities or assesses forms of 
engagement with this or the other ‘community’, those essentialisms often retain their 
force. Rogers Brubaker (2002: 166) argues that it is ‘central to the practice of politicized 
ethnicity’ to cast ethnic groups, races, or nations as protagonists, and make claims in their 
name, and his main concern is that academic analysts should not uncritically adopt these 
vernacular categories as their own. In his view, it is a category mistake to criticise the 
political practice of essentialising or reifying an ethnic group, for ‘reifying groups is 
precisely what ethnopolitical entrepreneurs are in the business of doing’ (167). I do not 
share his insouciance as regards the political practice. It is in our political activities and 
discourses that essentialism is most alive today, and this where it most needs to be 
challenged.  
 
Essentialism I 
The first problem with essentialism is the attribution of particular characteristics to 
everyone identified with a particular category, along the lines of ‘(all) women are caring 
and empathetic’, ‘(all) Africans have rhythm’, ’(all) Asians are community oriented’. The 
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‘all’ in such claims is usually implicit rather than stated, and even among those who hold 
most firmly to the view, allowance is commonly made for individual exceptions. It 
would, however, be a mistake to regard this as absolving the assertion from criticism. As 
the phrase about it being the exception that proves the rule suggests, acknowledging 
exceptions does not weaken the impact of the general rule. When a category that applies 
to billions (like women) is employed, even the most rigid of essentialists will of course 
anticipate exceptions. Investing such categories with explanatory force still remains an 
extraordinary leap.  
That said, there will often enough be some basis for the attribution. It is unlikely 
that the choice of characteristics is entirely random; and there may well be some observed 
history that lends itself to the claim. But the correlation might be statistically 
insignificant, and even where it is statistically strong, the attribution turns what is only 
probabilistically true into a much stronger claim. The problem here is one of over-
generalisation, stereotyping, and a resulting inability even to ‘see’ characteristics that do 
not fit your preconceptions. In practice, this leads to discrimination:  ‘I would never 
employ, marry, believe an X, because they are all unreliable.’  
There is plenty of research suggesting that the typical correlations are indeed 
misleading and overstated. As regards gender differences, it is widely thought that girls 
have better communication skills than boys and that boys are better at maths, that women 
are more empathic than men and men more aggressive than women, that girls and women 
are better at routine tasks while boys and men are better at complex problem solving; and 
there is indeed some evidence to substantiate these common beliefs. Yet when Janet 
Shibley White (2005) examined 124 meta-analyses of gender difference, she found the 
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gender differences close to zero or small in 78% of cases. There were differences, but the 
leap from this to claims of the form ‘(all) women x’ or ‘(all) men y’ was clearly 
unfounded. The studies approximated the stereotypes in only a few areas:  Hyde reports 
moderate to large differences in throwing velocity and distance (one thinks of Iris Marion 
Young’s famous essay (2005) on ‘Throwing Like a Girl’); in attitudes towards casual sex 
(men liked this more than women); and in physical – though less so verbal – aggression. 
In some of the most interesting results, Hyde reports the enormous power of self-
stereotyping according to dominant gender codes in ‘creating’ gender difference. In one 
such example, men and women were divided into two mixed groups and asked to 
complete the same maths test. The first group was told beforehand that the test was 
thought to contain a certain gender bias, the second that it was gender neutral. The men 
did better than the women in the first group, but there were no significant gender 
differences in performance in the second. Hyde concludes her analysis with a warning 
about the social costs of overinflated claims of gender differences.  
Similar points can be made with regard to inflated claims of cultural difference. 
As is particularly apparent from recent developments across Europe, exaggerated 
discourses of cultural difference can be employed to represent young women from ethnic 
minority backgrounds as peculiarly in need of state protection; and essentialised 
constructions of oppressive (ethnic minority) families and victimised (ethnic minority) 
young women can contribute to a climate in which governments find it acceptable to 
impose illiberal bans on activities involving minority ethnic groups. The decision of the 
French National Assembly to ban schoolchildren from wearing ‘conspicuous’ displays of 
religious or political allegiance in public schools (in intention and effect, banning the 
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Muslim headscarf) is one obvious example, for at least part of the justification for this 
was the claim that headscarves were being imposed on Muslim schoolgirls by family and 
community pressure.  The policies adopted across Europe of restricting the entry of 
fiancées or spouses from outside the European Union until the potential marriage partners 
are variously eighteen, twenty-one, or twenty-four is another telling illustration. Setting 
aside, for the purposes of argument, suspicions about the main object being to reduce 
non-white migration, the rationale is that this protects young people from coercion into 
marriage, for it is mainly young people of non European origin who are exposed to the 
dangers of forced marriage, and it is plausible to think they will be better able to 
withstand parental pressure when they are twenty-one or twenty-four than when they are 
sixteen. Different minimum ages for marriage to partners from inside or outside the EU 
are then justified by claims about the greater exposure to familial coercion and lesser 
ability to resist it for young people in minority ethnic groups.  These claims reflect and 
reproduce damaging cultural stereotypes (for fuller discussion, see Phillips, 2007; Scott, 
2007; Phillips and Saharso, 2008). 
I do not contest the claim that individuals are coerced – that some French 
schoolgirls adopt headscarves because of their fears of being harassed or denounced as 
impure, or that many young people are forced into unwanted marriages – but I take issue 
with the kind of racial profiling that generalises from evidence that some young people 
marrying partners from outside the EU are unwilling participants to a presumption that 
all such marriages are bogus. I do not think it appropriate to impose blanket bans on an 
entire practice because of evidence that some of those engaged in it are being coerced. I 
object to the failure to recognise that young people from minority ethnic groups can be as 
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clear in their own minds about the choices they are making as young people anywhere; 
and I believe that an essentialised discourse of minority cultures, as almost defined by 
their tendency to coerce and constrain, has combined with an essentialised discourse of 
the victimised young women from minority groups to legitimate these illiberal policies.   
As Ian Hacking reminds us, however, in his sceptical take on social 
constructionism, something might have an extra-theoretical function – might, for 
example, encourage racist or sexist ways of viewing people – and yet still be true. 
Unmasking a function does not in itself add up to refuting a claim. It has, moreover, been 
a key tenet of feminist and critical race theory that there are costs to denying as well as to 
exaggerating difference. Arguing for gender equality on the grounds that there are no 
differences between women and men can mean an over-ready acceptance of dominant 
scales of value. Arguing for racial equality on the grounds that we are all the same under 
the skin can suggest that some skin colours are indeed problematic. Arguing for cultural 
equality on the grounds that people are all fundamentally the same can suggest there is 
therefore no cost to being expected to align your own cultural practices with those of the 
dominant group. An unreflective critique of essentialism may not sufficiently address 
these concerns.  
Acknowledging difference is not necessarily essentialist. Even profiling is not all 
bad. Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (2006) notes that we do not usually consider it 
outrageous if the police work on the assumption that the perpetrator of a violent crime is 
more likely to be male than female; and even those strongly opposed to racial profiling 
tend to think it a waste of police resources if they search for the perpetrator of a racist 
hate crime among the victim’s own racial group.iii As regards forced marriage, while I 
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reject blanket bans, I do not consider it outrageous if police and social workers draw up 
lists of risk factors that help them identify the young people most likely to be at risk of 
coercion into marriage. Any such list is clearly open to stereotyping and 
misrepresentation, and it will often be the case that the harms associated with this – the 
potential demonisation of particular minority groups, and the treatment of young people 
from these groups as particularly passive victims – outweigh any advantages. But if we 
want societies to take effective action against problems such as forced marriage, targeting 
information and resources where they will be most effective looks a sensible idea.  
This suggests that what is wrong with this first kind of essentialism is to some 
extent a matter of degree. We can all agree that over-generalisation, stereotyping, and an 
inability even to perceive characteristics that do not fit our preconceptions is a problem; 
but the very use of ‘over’ generalisation may then be the important point. It is hard to see 
how any structured analysis of social and political issues is possible without abstraction 
and the deployment of (then always potentially stereotypical) generalisation. What else, 
after all, is induction?  Uma Narayan (1998) argues that ‘antiessentialism about gender 
and about culture does not entail a simple-minded opposition to all generalizations, but 
entails instead a commitment to examine both their empirical accuracy and their political 
utility or risk’. This suggests a continuum rather than an embargo, at least on this first 
version.  
 
Essentialism II 
In the second version of essentialism, characteristics are attributed, not to the individuals 
making up a particular category, but to the category itself. So, it is because you are a 
 12 
woman that you are more caring than a comparable man, not because you live in a 
society where girls and women are expected to be more caring, or a society where family 
policy encourages a division of labour between male breadwinners and female carers. 
This is probably what most people understand by essentialism: not merely a perception of 
groups as different (with the associated risks of over-generalisation), but the attribution of 
these differences to some underlying and static ‘essence’. This move naturalises 
differences that may be historically variant and socially created. As regards gender or 
race, this typically involves a biological or genetic determinism. As regards nationality or 
culture, it typically involves a reification that produces the ‘nation’ or the ’culture’ as an 
entity in itself.  As Brubaker (2002:164) puts it, the latter commits the error of 
‘groupism’: ‘the tendency to take discrete, sharply differentiated, internally homogeneous 
and externally bounded groups as basic constituents of social life, chief protagonists of 
social conflict, and fundamental units of social analysis’.  
It is easy to see why this kind of essentialism is problematic, though again, there 
are risks in overstating the case. We should surely criticise discourses that naturalise 
socially and historically constructed differences, that attribute, for example, women’s 
lesser participation in the world of high politics to a genetic difference between the sexes. 
It is not inconceivable, I suppose, that we might uncover a relevant genetic trait, but it 
would have to be very differentially distributed between the sexes to account for the 
current global imbalance, where women are less than one in five of the world’s elected  
representatives, and a miniscule proportion of the world’s leaders. There are explanations 
enough for this in the way our societies are organised without drawing on some as yet 
undiscovered string of DNA.  
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We should also, in my view, resist the more modest notion that social differences 
are ‘grounded’ by nature, because differences involve categories, and categories are the 
kind of thing that human beings produce to achieve some social purpose. I take this to be 
an important part of what Judith Butler (1999) argues in her critique of the sex/gender 
distinction. Thinking of ‘gender’ as a socially variable construct built upon a pre-given 
biological ‘sex’ is not enough to save us from the charge of essentialism, for in accepting 
without question the naturalness of the founding male/female divide, we concede too 
much to the norms of heterosexuality, and to the practice of grouping people according to 
their reproductive organs.  Why not group people according to height? Why not 
according to the length of their little finger? The reason, obviously enough, is that we live 
in societies that attach enormous significance to reproductive complementarity, and need 
therefore to know whether someone is biologically ‘female’ or ‘male’. But that is already 
a social explanation. The choice of salient distinction is not simply given to us by nature. 
It is itself a social act.  
The other point to stress is that the naturalising of socially and historically 
generated difference is not restricted to those categories most open to biological or 
genetic determinism, but can also figure in relation to ones that are self-evidently social 
and historical. Nations, for example, come into existence at particular periods of history, 
and even those with the most ethno-cultural conception of nation or nationality must 
know that these cannot be defined in biological or genetic terms.  So where is the 
essentialism here? I would locate it in the reification, the construction of nation or culture 
as entity. When people talk of ‘cultural practices’, or seek to explain the strange 
behaviour of their neighbours by reference to something termed their culture, they 
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conjure up a simplified and homogenized thing. As Tariq Modood (2007:93) puts it ‘rich, 
complex histories become simplified and collapsed into a teleological progress or unified 
ideological construct called French culture or European civilization or the Muslim way of 
life’.  It is one thing to talk of there being culturally specific ways of expressing joy or 
mourning the dead or ordering relations between women and men. It is quite another – 
and far more troubling - to say that ‘culture x’ organises gender relations in one way and 
‘culture y’ in another.  The first way of talking abut cultural difference is always 
vulnerable to stereotypes, over-generalisation, and the rigidity that fails to perceive when 
similarities are greater than difference (open, that is, to the worries attached to 
essentialism I), but it can also be relatively uncontentious. The second way of thinking 
about cultural difference commits us to culture with a capital C, and casts culture itself as 
protagonist. ‘Culture’ becomes the explanation, and people’s activities the explanandum. 
This is a route that brings us to an essentialised version of culture.  
 
Essentialism III 
The critique of stereotypes has been a staple of the feminist and anti-racist diet for years, 
and essentialisms I and II have come in for their fair share of attack. The irony, as many 
feminists and critical race theorists acknowledge, is that movements to combat the 
hierarchical structures that generate and sustain these stereotypes often invoke a 
collectivity that itself seems to presume a unified, perhaps essentialised, group.  
Feminism, for example, challenges absurdly over-stated generalisations about women 
and men, attacks discriminations and exclusions on the grounds of gender, and in some 
versions, argues for a world beyond gender. Susan Moller Okin (1989:171), for one, 
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argues that ‘a just future would be one without gender. In its social structures and 
practices, one’s sex would have no more relevance than one’s eye color or the length of 
one’s toes.’ Yet a feminist movement to achieve this self-evidently anti-essentialist goal 
necessarily invokes ‘women’, may indeed make a virtue out of women organising 
autonomously as women, and often calls for gender specific measures that treat women 
differently from men. This invocation of the very categories under attack is part of what 
Joan Scott (1996:3-4) calls the ‘constitutive paradox’ of feminism. As she puts it: 
Feminism was a protest against women’s political exclusion: its goal was to 
eliminate “sexual difference” in politics, but it had to make its claims on behalf of 
“women” (who were discursively produced through “sexual difference”). To the 
extent that it acted for “women”, feminism produced the “sexual difference” it 
sought to eliminate.’  
In the very practice of challenging a particular way of conceptualising women, feminists 
then seem doomed to replicate it.  
The ‘women’ brought into existence through this politics may, moreover, obscure 
many differences between women along axes such as class, sexuality, race, nationality, or 
religion. Feminists have rigorously avoided inflated claims about the essential differences 
between women and men, but in the practice of feminist politics are likely to make all 
kinds of generalisations about ‘women’ or ‘women’s interests’ or ‘women’s  oppression’. 
These are not, to be sure, the kind of generalisation that says women are good at routine 
tasks but bad at problem solving, but rather generalisations about women being 
discriminated against in employment or under-represented in politics or expected to 
assume primary responsibility for care. Yet these generalisations, too, can obscure 
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significant differences of location and concern, and often mean that the experiences of 
(all) women are read off the specificities of one sub-group. When the sub-group standing 
in for the category as a whole is relatively privileged, this poses an especially acute 
problem. ‘The feminist critique of gender essentialism does not merely charge that 
essentialist claims about “women” are overgeneralizations, but points out that these 
generalizations are hegemonic in that they represent the problems of privileged women 
(most often white, Western, middle-class, heterosexual women) as paradigmatic 
“women’s issues”.’ (Narayan, 1998: 86)  
Uma Narayan goes on to stress the irony: that in addressing the tendency towards 
gender essentialism, feminists sometimes replicated essentialised thinking at a new level. 
They accepted, that is, the injunction to attend more closely to differences among women 
and not presume that women throughout the world faced the same set of issues and 
concerns, but they sometimes did this through equally totalising categories such as 
Western culture, non-Western culture, or Third World women.  It became important not 
to generalise from the experiences of ‘Western women’ because this was said to fail to 
recognise the specificities of ‘Indian’ or ‘African’ culture’. Essentialised understandings 
of cultural or continental difference then replaced previously essentialised understandings 
of gender. I have said that there are costs to denying as well as to exaggerating difference, 
but too much anticipation of difference is also dangerous. Generalisations about how the 
people in particular cultural groups act, or what problems the women in those groups 
face, can be seriously misleading. 
The worries about simplifying, homogenising, and stereotyping take us back to 
issues already discussed under essentialism I. The more distinctive feature of essentialism 
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III is the way movements for political and social change conjure into existence ( in their 
own minds at least) political actors like workers, women, peasants, ‘the people’; and the 
problems associated with this way of conceiving social groups. When Spivak made her 
much repeated comments about the ‘strategic use of positivist essentialism’ (1988: 205), 
she was reflecting on the work of the Subaltern Studies group, and in particular their 
attempt to retrieve an ‘insurgent’ or ‘rebel’ or ‘subaltern’ consciousness from 
documentation written from the perspective of counter-insurgents. Claims about group 
consciousness look like essentialising claims, not just in the modest sense of generalising 
from what may be very different individual experiences, but in the attribution of an 
essential personhood to a group. A loose categorisation of multiple locations and 
perspectives then comes to figure almost as a person, capable of acting, willing, 
challenging, and having a consciousness all of its own. Even if we are suspicious of the 
notion of individuals having unified identities, the treatment of collectives as quasi-
persons endows them with more unity than they can justifiably claim. 
Can we, however, think politics without collectivities? Can we think collectivities 
without at least some kind of essentialism? In one illuminating discussion of this, Iris 
Marion Young (1994) utilises Sartre’s distinction between group and series to 
conceptualise gender as seriality.  She recommends that we reserve the term ‘group’ for 
self-consciously mutually acknowledging collectivities with a self-conscious purpose: 
reserve it, that is, for those historically specific and often short-lived moments when 
people do indeed combine together in a common project, and it becomes appropriate to 
describe them as part of a unified group. Groups come and go, however, emerging from 
and falling back into a less self conscious and more passively unified ‘series’.  A series is 
 18 
defined by reference to material practices and structures: ‘gender , like class, is a vast, 
multifaceted, layered, complex and overlapping set of structures and objects. Women are 
the individuals who are positioned as feminine by the activities surrounding those 
structures and objects.’ (p728)  
Much of the time we may not realise we are part of this series, though it could 
become quickly apparent when we discover shared limits and constraints. Even in 
realising this, however, we may choose not to make membership of that particular series 
a defining part of our identity. Gender as seriality is a material claim: it commits us to the 
view that there are social structures that impact, in however multifaceted a way, on all 
women; and while compatible with a great diversity of ways of experiencing being a 
woman, and with widespread refusal to adopt gender as self-definition, it would be 
thrown into question by evidence that being a woman set no limits to one’s life. In 
refusing, however, claims about the unity of experience or unity of identity, it offers a 
non-essentialist way of thinking of collectives. It also helps us understand the way a 
series can generate what is, genuinely, a group, and the way a group falls back into the 
relative passivity of the series, sometimes after succeeding in its political project, 
sometimes after failing.  
 
Essentialism IV   
The final way of thinking about essentialism is in some ways the most challenging, for 
this is an essentialism that comes into play precisely at the moment when the 
generalisation fails and the stereotypes no longer work. This is essentialism at its most 
overtly normative: the treatment of certain characteristics as the defining ones for anyone 
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in the category, as characteristics that cannot questioned or modified without thereby 
undermining one’s claim to belong to the group. So, you’re not really a lesbian if you 
also sleep with men; you’re not really working class if you like opera; you’re not really a 
Muslim if you tolerate non-believers.  
The normative weight is sometimes imposed from the outside, by people so mired 
in their stereotypes that they find themselves compelled to re-categorise those who 
display aberrant behaviour. Unable to cope with the idea that activities, interests, or 
qualities considered intrinsic to one category of person might be found in people 
belonging to another, they simply re-categorise the person. The more damaging cases are 
those where the normative weight is imposed from within the collectivity, such that 
people find themselves repudiated by what they had continued to consider their own 
community. At all those moments when you are told that you are not ‘really’ (Indian, 
working class, a feminist, a Trotskyist, whatever), there is a kind of categorical coercion 
at work. You are being refused your own self-definition because of some attribute 
deemed an essential component of the category you have tried to claim.   
Sadly, this kind of controlling, regulating, and policing activity can characterise 
movements for social change as much as movements against it. Perhaps particularly at 
the moment when what Iris Young termed a series generates a self-consciously 
committed group, the group may devote much of its energies to policing its own 
boundaries and ensuring that members really are united by the same practices and 
concerns. It is a frequent comment on radical politics that groups can become more 
preoccupied with the finer points of contention between themselves and their closest 
political neighbours than with self-evidently larger areas of disagreement with 
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mainstream political parties; dissidents within are continually at risk of expulsion. It is 
also one of the perennial criticisms of identity politics that the identity in question can 
become a form of social control, to the point where one’s choice of sexual partner or 
relationship to one’s parents, or even one’s holiday destination, can become the heated 
object of political debate. When this happens, the identity is being defined by reference to 
an essential defining characteristic, and those who do not fit are in trouble.  
Of the various meanings discussed in this essay, this last is the one where the 
essentialism seems most unambiguously wrong. Interestingly, it is also the version that 
comes least readily to the fore, perhaps because it is so patently grounded in non-
naturalistic claims. When people say I cannot regard you as an x because your views or 
lifestyle break the defining codes of x-ness, the ‘essence’ is clearly a social not a natural 
attribution. If being Indian, for example, were a matter of nature, nothing you 
subsequently did or said could take it away. It is precisely because it is a social construct 
that we are able to describe people as no longer ‘really’ Indian, or no longer  ‘really’ 
working class, or no longer ‘really’ lesbian. This reinforces the point made in relation to 
essentialism II: that it is a mistake to think of essentialism primarily in terms of nature or 
biology or genetics, for much of what we rightly criticise as essentialist is political or 
social or historical. Essentialism is a way of thinking not always so easily distinguished 
from more innocent forms of generalisation, and what is wrong with it is often a matter of 
degree rather than categorical embargo.  It should be clear, however, that we cannot hope 
to draw the line between an acceptable and indefensible essentialism in a distinction 
between the natural and the social.  
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i This may expose Baumann to Bruno Latour’s complaint against the archetypical 
‘critical sociologist’, who when asked whether constructed reality is constructed or real, 
blandly responds that it is both. Latour (2003) presents this as the ultimate trivialisation. 
He rejects both the idea that we could conjure something into existence purely through 
our categories, and that we could then find ourselves fooled by them. ‘”We” never build a 
world of our own delusion because there exists no such free creator as “us” …”we” are 
never deluded by a world of fancy because there exists no force strong enough to 
transform us into the mere slaves of powerful illusion.’.  
ii For a sympathetic but critical review see also Stoler (1997). 
iii He makes these observations in the context of a powerful argument against racial 
profiling. 
